II. THE BASIC MODEL AND SOME BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES
An individual has initial wealth We. There are two assets in which he can invest his wealth. The risky asset yields a random return per dollar invested of e (9) where 9 has a probability distribution F (0). The safe asset yields a sure rate of return per dollar invested of r. If we adopt the convention that e-(9) is nondecreasing with 9, then we can depict the pattern of returns for the two assets as in Figure Ia .4 It is assumed that e (0) does not depend on the amount invested in the risky asset, and that r is nonnegative. The individual wishes to maximize the expected utility of his wealth at the end of the period. If he invests (1-a) of his wealth in the safe asset and a in the risky asset, then his wealth at the end of the period is ( 
1) W= W0(1+ae+ (1-a)r).5 If we denote by E the expectations operator, then he wishes to maximize (2) E{U(W)}=-{U(Wo(l+ae(9)+(1-a)r))}dF(9).
If U" <O, in the absence of taxes a necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization is 6 (3) EU'(e-r)=0.
In the literature on uncertainty, two measures of risk aversion have been extensively used: absolute risk aversion -U"(W)/U'(W) =A(W) and relative risk aversion -U"(W) W U'(W) = R (W). Pratt7 has shown that an individual is indifferent between an uncertain wealth with mean E (W) and arbitrarily small variance U2; and a certain wealth of EW-A (E (W) )
-2 (which equals 4. The "safe" asset may also yield a random return and the analysis is unaffected, provided only that the safe asset is unambiguously safer. This means that if under some allocation of his wealth, the individual's income is greater in state 0 than in state 0', then under any alternative allocation his income is not less in state 0 than in state 0'. The pattern of returns can be depicted as in Figure Ib .
5. Throughout, we assume that his only source of wealth in the next period is from purchases of assets in this period.
6. This assumes that the individual can borrow as well as lend at r, and sell short as well as buy securities, i.e., a is not constrained. If a is constrained between Oa<1, then (3) holds only for interior solutions; otherwise a(1-a)EU'(e--r)=0;
(1-a)EU'(e-r)<O; and aEU'(e-r)>0. For the remainder of the analysis we shall assume that an interior maximum exists. These assumptions about the utility function are equivalent to the following assumptions about how the allocation to the risky asset changes as wealth increases:
A.' As wealth increases, more of the risky asset is purchased, i.e., the -risky asset is superior.
B.' As wealth increases, the proportion of one's wealth in the risky asset decreases.
It is easy to show that A and A' and B and B' are equivalent: (3) defines an implicit equation for a in terms of W0. Using the implicit function theorem and integrating by parts, the result is immediate. This result can also be seen graphically as follows. We consider the special case where there are only two states of the world, 01 with probability Pi and 02 with probability P2. If the individual purchases only the safe security, his wealth at the end of the period is represented by the point S in Figure II, are correct, then we can make some unambiguous statements about the effects of taxation on risk-taking, independent of the probability distribution of returns for the risky asset, but if these hypotheses are not correct, many of the conclusions of the original MusgraveDomar analysis may no longer be valid. Our measure of risk-taking is the individual's demand for risky assets; this is simply measured by the fraction of his portfolio devoted to the risky asset. This corresponds to the Domar-Musgrave concept of total (or social) risk-taking. In contrast, there is no obvious corresponding measure of "private risk-taking." One natural measure, which we shall use, is the (subjectively perceived) standard deviation of wealth. In the absence of taxes, this is simply equal to Woao,, where a is the standard deviation of the risky asset.
III. WEALTH TAX
We begin the discussion with an investigation of the effects of the wealth tax, since this is the simplest case to analyze. A proportional wealth tax at the rate t means that wealth at the end of the period is given by (8) W= Wo (1+ (1-a)r+ae) (1-t).
It should be immediately apparent that changing the tax rate is just equivalent to changing Wo in terms of the effect on risk-taking. Hence we immediately obtain: Proposition 1 (a). A proportional wealth tax increases, leaves unchanged, or decreases the demand for risky assets as the individual has increasing, constant, or decreasing relative risk aversion.
After tax private risk-taking, P, is given by
P= [E(W-E(W))2]2=
[E(Woa(l-t)) We begin the analysis with the case of only two states of nature. In Figure IIla we have drawn the before-tax budget constraint ST. Income is measured by the distance from, say, T to Wo or S to WO, so an income tax at the rate t reduces the returns from investing in only the safe asset or the risky asset to S' and T', respectively. The after-tax budget constraint is the line joining T' to S'. It is clearly parallel to ST. Note, however, that a is not constant along a ray through the origin, but along a ray through the point Wo. Thus, it is immediately apparent that in this simple example if individuals have constant or increasing relative risk aversion, or increasing absolute risk aversion, risk-taking will increase. But if In the more general case, only slightly stronger conditions are required to guarantee that a proportional tax will increase risktaking. The condition for utility maximization is simply EU'(e-r) =0.
It is of the same form as the no-tax condition, since both the risky and safe asset are taxed proportionately. We wish to know, how does a change with t:
-E (e-r) The denominator of (10) is always positive, so whether increasing taxes leads to more or less investment in the risky assets depends on the numerator of equation (10). If we set r=O, from (10)' it is immediately apparent that a increases, and in proportion to the change in (1-t). It is also clear that if there is increasing absolute risk aversion, as in the quadratic utility function, the second term is unambiguously positive and the percentage increase in a from a percentage decrease in (1-t) is greater than unity.3
If in equation (10), we recall that Y=W-Wo, we obtain the result that the numerator of (10) is equal to 
V. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS
Our present tax laws however, do not treat all risks alike; indeed, one of the main justifications for the special capital gains provisions is that they encourage risk-taking. This, however, may not always be the case. Take, for instance, the extreme case of a tax only on the safe (or the relatively safe) asset, with no tax on the risky asset. It is easy to show that the demand for the risky asset increases or decreases as (11) -WOE U" Ir(1 -a) (e -r (1-t) ) +EU'r:::O and by arguments exactly analogous to those presented above, we can show: Proposition 3(a). A tax on the safe asset alone will increase the demand for the risky asset if there is constant or increasing absolute risk aversion.
Rearranging terms in (11), we obtain the result that the sign of da/dt depends on the sign of rE { Uj W+1 } U'-WorE (U") (1 +e).
Under limited liability, e > -1, so the second term is unambiguously positive, while the first term is positive if 'relative risk aversion is always less than or equal to unity. Hence, we have shown Proposition 3(b). A tax on the safe asset alone will increase the demand for risky assets if relative risk aversion is less than or equal to unity.
If there is decreasing absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion is greater than unity it is surely possible for the tax on the safe asset to lead to less rather than more risk-taking. In Section VII, we shall compare this tax explicitly with a proportional income tax. To see this, all we have to observe is that for tax rates near 100 per cent, almost the entire portfolio is allocated to the safe asset since, as the tax rate approaches 100 per cent, the maximum return on the risky asset approaches zero and the expected return becomes negative. Since the indifference curves are convex, the demand curves for the different assets are continuous functions of the tax rate.
VI. No Loss
Moreover, it is easy to show that there will always be less risk-taking than with full loss-offset. Consider first the effects of partial offsetting, where we are allowed to deduct a portion of losses from the risky asset from other income. Income, when e <0, can be written We shall now attempt to find some more precise conditions under which risk-taking unambiguously increases or decreases. For simplicity we limit ourselves to the case where r= 0. We can write the first order conditions for expected utility maximization as (12) fU'e (1-t) dF (G) +SU'edF () =0 0' ~~~~~0 so the sign of da/dt is that of (1-t) 2WodF (9) +o0' ( -U") e2WodF (9) < fJ-U"e2 (1-t) 2WodF (9) -Of'U"e 2(1-t) 2W0dF (0) -o0'U"e2 WodF (9) (1-t) 2Bi
(1-t) 2or21+0%22
if U"'>O. But
only if U"'>O.
VII. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
Even if risk-taking is increased by a given type of tax, it is not clear that such a tax should be adopted: after all, risk-taking is not an end itself. Indeed, there are some who have argued that the stock market pools risk sufficiently effectively that there is no discrepancy between social and private risks, and hence no justification for governmental encouragement of risk-taking. It is important to observe, however, that some of the taxes considered may be more effective in obtaining a given end than others. Alternative taxes can be evaluated in terms of (a) losses in expected utility, (b) changes in demands for risky assets, and (c) revenues raised in each state of nature. Note that the last is much more stringent than comparisons simply between average revenues; two taxes may have the same expected revenue, but differ in the revenue they provide in different states of nature.
In this section we shall analyze the welfare implications of the preferential treatment of capital gains. To do this, we shall look at the polar case where risky assets are completely exempt from taxation, and compare its effects with those of alternative taxes. Comparison of Effects on Risk-taking of Income and Wealth Taxes from the income tax is given by E', the before-tax income is given by B, where E'B lies on a straight line through Wo. Since the tax on the safe asset only reduces income in both states of nature by the same amount, if the after-tax income from the tax on the safe asset only is E, the before-tax income is A, where EA is a 450 line. The fact that B may be closer or further from T than A implies that the demand for the risky asset may be larger or smaller with the income tax than with the tax on the safe asset only. Revenue is measured by the vector EA for the tax on the safe asset only and E'B for the income tax: one is larger in one state, the other in the other state. It can be seen from the diagram that, in general, there will not exist income taxes yielding the same revenue in each state of nature as yielded by the tax on the safe asset only.
Similar conclusions hold for a comparison between wealth taxes and the tax on the safe asset only. It is possible, however, to show that, for the same loss in expected utility, the income tax leads to more risk-taking than the wealth tax. See Figure VI . We have already noted that B is the before-tax wealth corresponding to the after-income-tax situation E', while A corresponds to the after-wealth-tax situation E', where EA lies on a straight line through the origin. But since A is closer to S than B, the result is immediate.
B. Comparison of taxes of equal revenue.
As noted above, we cannot make direct comparisons of different taxes with equal revenue in each state of nature. But we can compare the taxes indirectly by comparing each with a lump sum tax, i.e., a tax independent of the behavior of the individual although not of the state of nature. While the effect on risk-taking of a proportional income tax or a wealth tax is identical to that of the equal revenue lump sum tax, a tax on the safe asset only leads to more risktaking but lower expected utility than the equal revenue lump sum tax. To see this, observe that in Figure VI the lump sum tax of equal revenue to the wealth tax is given by E'A (for the income tax it is E'B). The after-lump-sum tax budget constraint is given by S'T', so the equilibrium is still at E', and hence the taxes are equivalent in their effect on the demand for risky assets and on expected utility. In Figure VII , since the revenue from the tax on the safe asset only is EA, the after-lump-sum tax budget constraint is w(e2) S L E A .,___L~~~L w(e1) FIGURE 
VII
Comparison of Effects on Expected Utility of Tax on Safe Asset and Equal Revenue Lump Sum Tax LL, and the equilibrium is given by E', which implies a higher demand for risky assets but at the cost of a lower level of utility for the tax on the safe asset than for the equal revenue lump sum tax.
The important point to observe is that even if one wished to encourage greater risk-taking, and even if preferential treatment of capital gains did this effectively, it is not clear that preferential treatment of capital gains is the most desirable way of encouraging risk-taking.
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